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The Supreme Court and the Shareholder
Litigant: Basic, Inc. v. Levinson
in Context

Jayne W. Barnard*

Twenty-five years ago, in J./. Case Co. v. Borak,l the United States
Supreme Court unanimously held that, in order to effectively supplement the often~overwhelmed enforcement efforts of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), it would recognize an implied
right of action, enabling private investors to seek damages and other
relief under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2
Six years later, the Court enhanced the incentives for private enforcement by providing for the award of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in
Exchange Act cases.a
Then, in 1971, in a case brought under rule lOb-5 of the Exchange
Act,4 the Court opened the courthouse doors to litigants claiming
fraud in any way "touching" the purchase or sale of securities.s
These invitations quickly bore fruit, and in the early 1970's, federal
securities litigation blossomed. Both private plaintiffs and the Securities and Exchange Commission increasingly sought federal court resolution of disputes related to securities transactions. In the course of
five years, the federal courts' inventory of securities-related suits
doubled.
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, Virginia. This article is in memory of Arnold Shure. John C. Tucker
contributed to its concept and form, and I am grateful for his helpful suggestions.
James Anastos, Daniel Bennett, and Michael Grattan provided research assistance.
1. 377 u.s. 426 (1964).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
3. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
5. Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S.
6, 12-13 (1971).
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Fiscal
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

Lawsuits commenced
in federal courts6

Lawsuits commenced
by the SEC7

1211
1962
1919
1999
2378
2408

111
140
119
178

148
174

Throughout this period, however, Chief Justice Burger and others
increasingly decried the weight of the federal court caseload.s The
Chief Justice in particular lamented that, while many decisions in
the late 1960s and early 1970s had added "new burdens" to the federal docket,9 "no decision of the courts ha[d] subtracted any significant burden from the avalanche which ha[d] fallen upon the Federal
Courts."lO
Chief Justice Burger's words were prophetic in that, in a cluster of
decisions issued between 1975 and 1979,11 the Supreme Court did precisely what he had been hoping for-it sharply circumscribed the
ability of the federal courts to hear securities-related disputes, particularly those initiated by private shareholders as class actions. While
these decisions were consistent with the Court's contemporaneous attempts to limit federal court access generally, for example by redefining concepts of federalism and abstention,l2 standing,l3 implied
private rights of actionl4 and class actions,1s the rhetoric of the secur6. REPORTS, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, U.S. COURTS,
Table 2C (1970-1988).
7. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORTS (1970-1988).
8. E.g., Burger, Has the Time Come?, 55 F.R.D. 119 (1972) (noting expansion in
federal district court filings from over 88,000 in fiscal year 1959 to over 140,000 in fiscal
year 1972); A. BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT-AND WHAT IF ANYTHING TO Do ABOUT IT (1973) (reporting on the recommendations of a court-appointed
study group reviewing problems of court administration, including elimination of statutory three-judge courts, establishment of an administrative body to hear prisoner
complaints, improvement of court secretarial services and the establishment of a National Court of Appeals).
9. Burger, supra note 8, at 120.
10. !d.
11. See infra notes 93-156 and accomp~ying text.
12. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
13. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
14. E.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
15. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (imposing on the plaintiff class representative in rule 23(b)(3) cases costs of notifying class members of their
right to opt-out); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (restricting use
of the class action form in diversity cases). See generally Morrison, Rights Without
Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal Courts Out of the Business of Protecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 841 (1977) (reviewing the Court's use of "devices used to deny access to federal courts"); Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New
Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665
(1987) (tracing the actions of the Burger Court in impeding the enforcement of rights
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ities law cases focused specifically on problems associated with corporate governance. The Court made it clear that shareholders and their
"strike suits" against corporate managers, like prisoners suing their
wardens16 or soldiers suing their commanding officers,17 were disfavored in the federal forum.1s
The Court's decisions in this period can be viewed as serving two
complementary purposes. By presenting a hostile face to shareholder
litigation, the Court sought to limit the filing of cases which,
although comprising only a small percentage of the federal docket,19
occupy a vastly disproportionate amount of judicial time and attention due to their complexity.zo The Court also found a ready vehicle
by which to give expression to the "pro-business" philosophy of an increasingly conservative Court.21
Not surprisingly, court filings under the Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act (particularly those brought by private plaintiffs)
precipitously declined.22
Fiscal
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979

Lawsuits commenced
in federal courts
2230
1960
1703
1508

Lawsuits commenced
by the SEC
158

166
135
108

Despite the Court's limiting decisions, however, the activity attendant to the "economic recovery" of the early 1980s and the takeover
frenzy which accompanied it (marking the emergence of new takeover defenses of contested legitimacy) generated renewed invocation
of the federal securities laws. The federal court securities caseload
by construction of "procedural barriers that leave victims without a practical
remedy").
16. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
17. Cf. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
18. See infra notes 93-156 and accompanying text. Judicial hostility to shareholder suits has a long history. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949) (recounting the origins of the derivative action, and noting that it was frequently abused by "small and irresponsible ... stockholders").
19. Cases filed under the federal securities and commodities laws during fiscal
year 1988 totalled 2649. The total number of cases of all categories filed during the
year was 240,821.
20. Securities cases frequently involve multiple defendants. They are frequently
document-intensive, technically complicated and, because of the economic resources
(including insurance) of the defendants, vigorously defended.
21. Cf. Cohen & Milstein, The Burger Court and Business, in THE BURGER COURT:
RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT 1969-1986 (Schwartz ed. 1987) (focusing
on the pro-business orientation of the Court's anti-trust cases during this period).
22. See supra notes 6 & 7.
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again doubled in a five-year period:23
Fiscal
Year

Lawsuits commenced
in federal courts

Lawsuits commenced
by the SEC

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

1694
1768
2376
2915
3142
3266

103
115
136
151
179
143

The Chief Justice's complaints about the federal court caseload and
attendant discovery abuses had not abated, however,24 and an increasingly conservative Court still had available to it new mechanisms by which to exclude shareholders from the federal system.
Most notably in its decisions enforcing the use of brokerage firm arbitration agreements,2s the Court continued in its efforts to curtail
use of the federal courts for the resolution of claims brought by
shareholders. Curiously, the Court's ruling in Landreth Timber Co.
v. Landreth,26 which rejected the "sale of business" doctrine, had just
the opposite result of encouraging resort to federal courts where previously disputes had been consigned to non-federal venues.
By the late-1980s, even as publicity about securities law violations
was becoming a staple of the popular press, the Supreme Court's actions and, perhaps, the decline in the size of the shareholder pool,27
led to a new decline in federal court lawsuits seeking enforcement of
the securities laws.2s
Fiscal
Year

1986
1987
1988

Lawsuits commenced
in federal courts
3059
3020
2649

Lawsuits commenced
by the SEC
163
142
n/a

Then, following hard on the heels of the November 1987 "market
break," the Supreme Court issued its decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,29 sanctioning entirely new avenues of shareholder redress under
the federal securities laws. By rejecting a "bright line" test for determining the materiality of communications to shareholders,3o the
Court virtually ~ssured that corporate disclosure decisions would
23. See supra notes 6 & 7.
24. See Burger, The Time is Now for the Intercircuit Panel-The State of the Judiciary Address, 71 A.B.A. J. 86, 87 (Apr. 1985) (noting 5100 cases on the Supreme Court
docket in the 1984 term compared to 1463 in 1953).
25. See infra note 158.
26. 471 u.s. 681 (1985).
27. By 1986, institutional investors held 42.7% of the total market value of American equity investments. COLUMBIA CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJECT (Nov. 1988).
28. See supra notes 6 & 7.
29. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
30. See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
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more frequently be challenged by disgruntled shareholders. And,
even more significantly, by embracing the "fraud-on-the-market"
theory,31 the Court in Basic seemed yet again, and at a crucial time,32
to be opening the door to increased shareholder enforcement of the
federal securities laws.
However, this reading of Basic may be misleading. The Basic decision is the result of an unrepresentative panel and the work of an unlikely author.33 Three of the most conservative members of the
Court-Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy-did not participate
in the Basic decision. Justices White and O'Connor, who did, joined
only in the materiality portion of the decision, but dissented from the
adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory.34
Moreover, Basic must be read in light of its history. This article
explores that history, and its implications for the shareholder litigant
in the future. Part I traces the Court's securities law decisions from
Borak forward, focusing on the shifting balance from a liberal Court
which favored multiple methods of securities law enforcement to a
conservative Court bent on limiting shareholders' remedies, particularly in the class action context.35 This articie will examine especially the developing views of those Justices who now comprise the
plurality in Basic-Justices Blackmuii, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Part II explores Basic itself and its upside potential for future
types of shareholder litigation. It notes the ironic situation in which
the non-plurality Justices now find themselves-on the one hand
favoring strict docket control and corporate freedom from shareholder "harassment," while on the other embracing economic theories which favor shareholder litigants heretofore excluded from
federal courts.
31. See infra notes 212-36 and accompanying text.
32. Smart & Zigas, Watchdog Woes: Up Against it at the SEC, Bus. WK., Oct. 10,
1988, at 120 (detailing the serious lack of resources available to Commission for use in
enforcement).
33. See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
35. A number of articles have focused on the Court's dramatic shift of emphasis in
securities cases as between the Warren Court and the Burger Court through the 1970s.
See, e.g., Allen, Rule 10b-5 and the Burger Court-Time to Reexamine the Elements for
a 10b-5 Action, 82 CoM. L.J. 118 (1977); Freeman, A Study in Contrasts: The Warren
and Burger Courts Approach to the Securities Laws, 83 DICK. L. REV. 183 (1978); Hazen, Symposium Introduction-The Supreme Court and the Securities Laws: Has the
Pendulum Slowed?, 30 EMORY L.J. 5 (1981); Whitaker & Rotch, The Supreme Court
and the Counter-Revolution in Securities Regulation, 30 ALA. L. REV. 335 (1979); Note,
The Supreme Court's Trimming of the Section 10(b) Tree: The Cultivation of a New
Securities Law Perspective, 3 J. CORP. L. 112, 129-37 (1977).
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I. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE SECURITES LAWS: 1964-1989
A. 1964-1969: The Warren Court and the Borak Case-Recognizing
the Need for Private Enforcement
In the Fall of 1956, J.l. Case Co., a midwestern farm-machinery
concern, and American Tractor Corporation proposed to merge. Carl
H. Borak, a Case shareholder, sought to enjoin the merger on the
grounds, inter alia, that its terms were unfair to Case shareholders.
When the injunction was denied and the merger went forward,
Borak amended his complaint to seek rescission and damages, relying
on the anti-fraud provisions of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.
Case and its managers argued that investors had no private rights
under the proxy provisions of the Exchange Act-and indeed none
were expressly set forth-but the Supreme Court held otherwise, asserting that "(p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to [SEC] action."36 Noting the thousands of proxy
statements submitted to the SEC each year, the Court recognized
that deputization of shareholders would serve "as a most effective
weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements."37 Moreover,
the Court expressly noted the "hurdles ... (such as separate suits,
security for expenses statutes, bringing in all parties necessary for
complete relief, etc.)" confronting shareholders who seek relief in
state courts.as The Court's clear preference was that shareholders
should be afforded the benefits of simplified federal procedure, even
in contexts not expressly anticipated by Congress.
Over the next five years, the Court continued to express this expansive view of the securities laws, providing in Tcherepnin v.
Knight39 for a widely inclusive reading of the term "security" for
purposes of protection under the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act4o and in SEC v. National Securities41 for the primacy of
the federal securities law over state insurance regulation in the context of a merger between publicly held insurance companies.
These cases may have reflected the strong influence on the Court,
particularly in the area of securities regulation, of Justice William 0.
Douglas, whose years as the aggressive Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission had given him a strong enforcement bias,
and Justice Hugo L. Black, a loyal New Dealer and former plaintiffs'
36. J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 435 (citations omitted).
39. 389 u.s. 332 (1967).
40. At issue was whether withdrawable capital shares in a state-chartered savings
and loan association were securities under federal law, or whether investors in such
shares would be limited to state law remedies when alleging fraud in connection with
the sale of the instruments. /d. at 332.
41. 393 u.s. 453 (1969).
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lawyer who looked out for the "little investors" and was wise to the
ways of corporate managers. 42 They may also have reflected the
view of Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had made his life in law enforcement43 and recognized the value of deputization.44 Soon to
come, however, was Chief Justice Warren Burger, who had campaigned for his position on a "law and order" platform but whose credentials as a law enforcement officer were negligible.45 Moreover,
his commitment to law enforcement was at least equalled by his commitment to other "Republican values," including "free enterprise"
and the elimination of governmental interference with business.

B.

1969-1972: Mills, Bankers' Life and Affiliated Ute-The Early
Burger Court Widens the Welcome

After the ascendency of Warren Burger to the position of Chief
Justice and the arrival of Justice Harry Blackmun,46 the Court,
under the continuing influence of its "securities expert," Justice
Douglas, at first continued to express an expansive view of shareholders' private rights of action, and specifically encouraged shareholders' class actions. This willingness to facilitate federal court
redress of investor grievances was most vividly displayed during
Chief Justice Burger's first term in the decision in Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co.,47 a case which was conceived in the same "strike-suit"
law offices that had handled the seminal Borak case.
Mills, like Borak, involved a shareholder challenge to a corporate
merger. Plaintiffs, shareholders in the Electric Auto-Lite Co., ob42. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966) (noting the
important role of shareholder derivative suits in "protecting shareholders of corporations from the designing schemes and wiles of insiders who are willing to betray their
company's interests in order to enrich themselves").
43. Following his Army service, Warren joined the staff of the Oakland city attorney in 1919. He then joined the office of the Alameda County prosecutor in 1920,
where he served until 1938, when he was elected California Attorney General. C.
BARNES, MEN OF THE SUPREME COURT 153 (1978).
44. Prior to the chairmanship of William Cary beginning in 1961, the notion of
"deputization" would have been regarded as curious, given that 'the SEC's own enforcement efforts were so tepid. But "[d)uring the three years of Cary's chairmanship,
the [SEC) initiated approximately as many cases as it had in the previous twenty-six
years." J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 361 (1982). Under
Chairman Manuel Cohen, who succeeded Cary, the Commission further expanded its
enforcement activities. Id. at 361-63.
45. Burger served two years as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil
Division of the Justice Department. C. BARNES, supra note 43, at 47.
46. Warren Burger became Chief Justice on June 23, 1969. Justice Blackmun
joined the Court on June 9, 1970.
47. 396 u.s. 375 (1970).
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jected that the proxy solicitation they had received had misrepresented the facts concerning the recommendation by the Auto-Lite
Board that the merger be approved.4B Because over fifty percent of
Auto-Lite's stock was controlled by the proposed merger partner and
the merger had been approved by a majority of shareholders far exceeding the necessary two-thirds vote, the defendants urged that, unless plaintiffs could prove that the terms of the merger had been
"unfair," their complaint should be dismissed.49 The Court, in an
opinion particularly solicitous of the problems of "small shareholders" seeking to enforce the securities laws,so held that no such showing would be required. All that was required was that plaintiffs show
that the proxy solicitation sent to them had been "materially
misleading."sl
The Court went on to provide that shareholders able to demonstrate a material misstatement or omission in a proxy statement
would be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees for having "vindicat[ed] the statutory policy" and "render[ing] a substantial service to
the corporation and its shareholders."s2 This would be so even if
plaintiffs could never prove monetary damages.sa Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys had a strong incentive to seek out, organize and prosecute actions on behalf of aggrieved shareholders, even where defendants'
violations of the securities laws might be characterized as "technical."
The Court, at this point, was not only tolerant of the possible abuses
which would result from shareholder vigilantism, but was willing to
encourage such conduct as a means of more effectively enforcing the
securities laws.
The Burger Court's receptivity to the notion of private enforcement of the federal securities laws was again obvious in the 1971 decision Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. 54
By the time of this decision, Justice Black had died and would soon
be replaced by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., a long-time corporate defense lawyer.ss Justice Harlan, who authored the Auto-Lite decision,
had retired and his place remained vacant pending the arrival of his
replacement, William Rehnquist. Notwithstanding these developments, which would soon dramatically alter the Court's approach to
securities cases, the Court's temporarily diminished commitment to
48. Id. at 377-78, 380.
49. See id. at 380-83.
50. See id. at 382.
51. Id. at 382-86.
52. Id. at 387-94.
53. Id. at 394.
54. 404 u.s. 6 (1971).
55. Powell served on several corporate boards, and had served as President of the
American Bar Association, the American Bar Foundation and the American College of
Trial Lawyers. C. BARNES, supra note 43, at 119.
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citizen enforcement of the securities laws remained strong. The decision of the seven member court in Bankers Life favorable to the
plaintiff was unanimous.
The facts in Bankers Life have been described as "incredibly complicated,"56 but, when stripped of their diversionary details, were
rather simple: Manhattan Casualty Co. had been acquired from its
parent by an investor, Begole, whose intent was "to pay for [the Manhattan] stock, not out of [his] own funds, but with Manhattan's assets."57 In the course of a day's hectic dealing, Manhattan's new
management sold $4.8 million of the company's United States Treasury bonds, and then applied the proceeds to pay off the loan with
which Begole had purchased Manhattan's shares. Begole's slight of
hand, which traditionally would have been regarded as simply managerial misappropriation subject to state court oversight, was said by
the plaintiff, Manhattan's receiver, also to represent a "manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance" uin connection with" Manhattan's
sale of the government bonds, thus requiring the matter to be heard
in federal court under section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.58 The receiver's complaint, however, had been dismissed by
both the district court and a divided panel of the court of appeals, on
the ground that the receiver had "not made out a claim cognizable
under the federal Securities Acts,"59 and thus could only seek redress
in the state courts. Certiorari was granted to consider whether rule
lOb-5 encompassed transactions such as Begole's and whether the
misappropriation of the proceeds of the · sale of a security could be
held to have occurred "in connection with" that sale.
The Bankers Life decision comprised less than eight pages. It was
written by the most ardent of the regulatory justices, William 0.
Douglas. In Justice Douglas's characteristically exuberant prose,6o
56. L. Loss, FuNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 903 (1983).
57. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 7. The notion that there is something amiss in this
goal is curious in an era of leveraged buyouts.
58. !d. at 9. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
15 u.s.c. § 78j(6) (1982).
.
.
59. Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 430 F.2d
355, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1980).
60. "Douglas always claimed that the work of the Court never took more than
three or four days a week; he read petitions rapidly, rarely agonized over decisions,
could get to the heart of an issue instantly, and wrote his opinions quickly." THE
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the Court first observed that corporate investors such as Manhattan,
as well as individual investors, were protected by section 10(b).61
Moreover, such investors were protected whether they traded on an
organized securities exchange, through the over-the-counter market,
or otherwise.s2 The absence of an express private right of action in
section lO(b) was not a disability for investors who had been injured
by another's misconduct.63 In addition, such investors were protected under federal law from schemes which "deprived [them] of
any compensation for the sale of [a] valuable block of securities."64
This was so even where the schemers responsible for this deprivation
were the corporation's own executives.ss The Court concluded its
sweeping exigesis of rule lOb-5 by admonishing: "Section lO(b) must
be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively. Since there was a
'sale' of a security and since fraud was used in 'connection' with it,
there is redress under§ lO(b), whatever might be available as a remedy under state law."66
Litigants and their counsel were quick to respond to this encouraging vision of rule lOb-5 and its uncompromising message to the lower
courts that shareholder-initiated claims under the securities laws
were to be read liberally, and with a rebuttable presumption in favor
of federal court resolution.s7
The Burger Court sent a comparable message just a few months
later in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States.ss This case,
like Bankers Life, focused on an individual, rather than a class claim,
arising out of a fact situation not involving the typical "small shareholder" in the trading markets. At issue was the conduct of tribal advisers in connection with the transfer to white buyers of shares
which had been restricted to ownership by members of the Ute Indian tribe. But Affiliated Ute, like Bankers Life, was important beyond its idiosyncratic facts.
The specific question before the Court was whether a Ute seller of
securities could maintain a cause of action against a white buyer (or
his agent) who acquired the seller's shares at $300 per share knowing
DOUGLAS LETTERS-SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 .
DOUGLAS xvii (Urofsky ed. 1987). Some said his decisions were "'slapdash." Id. at x.
By the time he joined the Court in 1965, Douglas's friend Abe Fortas concluded that,
after 25 years on the Court, Douglas had become bored with his judicial work and had
gotten "sloppy in writing his opinions." B.A. MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF
A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 214 (1988).
61. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 13 n.9.
64. /d. at 10.
65. Id.
66. /d. at 12.
67. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
68. 406 u.s. 128 (1972).
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their market value in the white community was in excess of $500 per
share. The significant question was whether the buyers could defend
on the ground that they had made no affirmative misstatements of
fact to the sellers at any time during their dealings.
In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun-his first in the field of
federal securities law since coming on the bench in 1970--the Court
held that where a buyer of stock fails to disclose to the seller in a
face-to-face transaction material information (such as the prevailing
market price of the stock), he has failed to fulfill a duty to disclose69
and positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to the seller's recovery under rule lOb-5. "All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have
considered them important in the making of [an investment] decision."7o As will be seen, Affiliated Ute had a strong influence on
later cases well beyond those involving face-to-face transactions,n
and was a direct antecedent of the Basic decision.72
Just as Bankers Life was understood to minimize plaintiffs' burden
in satisfying the "in connection with" requirement of rule lOb-5, Affiliated Ute was understood to minimize the reliance/causation element of claims brought under the rule. However, perhaps energized
by the arrival of Justices Rehnquist and Powell (who did not participate in either decision), the Court soon began to reconsider the implications of Bankers Life and Affiliated Ute.
This process of reevaluation involved five separate, although intertwining, considerations:
(1) Concern about and hostility to the increase in federal court filings vs.
the need to encourage private enforcement of the federal securities laws in order to compensate for the inadequate resources of the SEC.
(2) Hostility to plaintiff class actions generally, especially those which could
be characterized as lawyer-motivated "strike suits" vs. approval of the class
action device as the only feasible way for plaintiffs with a small stake in the
enterprise to protect themselves against improper conduct which results in
large damages spread among thousands of people.
(3) Hostility to "overregulation" and "harassment" of businesses and their
managers vs. the need to protect shareholders (and others who deal with business) from overreaching.
( 4) Resistance to the "federalization" of corporate law and the parallel desire to leave to the state courts disputes traditionally resolved there vs. defer69. The decision does not specifically articulate the source of this "duty," an issue
which only later became significant in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
See id. at 231-32.
70. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S at 153-54.
71. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
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ence to the regulatory expertise of the SEC and federal courts in resolving
disputes under federal law.
(5) A commitment to strict statutory construction vs. a desire to effectuate
the intended goals of the statute writers.
,

For clarity, throughout the balance of this paper, I have designated
these considerations respectively "caseload," "class action access,"
"managerial prerogative," "federalism," and "statutory integrity."
The need to balance and resolve the competing values embodied in
these considerations, essentially invisible in the Warren era decisions,
came more and more to dominate the Burger Court's decisions in
cases involving the securities laws.
1972-197~The

C

Slow Beginning of a Long Retreat

Two cas~s decided during the period 1972-1975, which seemed totally unrelated to the rule 10b-5 issues examined in Bankers Life and
Affiliated Ute, set the tone for that which was to come. Both cases
limited the scope of section 16(b) of the Exchange Act,73 which had
bEren enacted to permit shareholders to require disgorgement to the
corporate treasury of "short-swing" trading profits gained by corporate executives and persons who were ten percent shareholders at
the t~me of both the purchase and the sale. In Reliance Electric Co.
v. Emerson Electric Co.,74 the Court held that a speculator which had
acquired 13.2% ownership of a company through a tender offer and
within six months had sold off its shares in sequential sales representing 3.24% and then 9.96%, would be liable only for the profits on
its first sale, inasmuch as, at the time of the second sale, the speculator was no longer a 10% shareholder of the target so was not governed by section 16(b).75 This sell-off scheme, which had been
devised by the speculator's general counsel, had as its clear intent the
evasion of section 16(b)'s coverage; but the Court in a 4-3 decision
written by Justice Stewart76 chose, quite contrary to the spirit of
Bankers Life, to read the statute "technically and restrictively," and
immunized from shareholder recovery any profits not strictly within
section 16(b)'s purview. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices White
and Brennan, predictably dissented, arguing that the majority's position "undermine[d]" the purposes of the statute,77 and was "plainly
at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole."78
In this decision we can see the first stirrings of what I have designated as the "statutory integrity" issue of the debate which was to
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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15 u.s.c. § 78 (1982).
404 u.s. 418 (1972).
Id. at 422-27.
Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in this case.
Reliance, 404 U.S. at 431 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting U.S. v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534-43 (1939)).
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mature over the next decade, with the conservative justices generally
favoring a narrow "plain language" approach and the more liberal
justices favoring a broader and more instrumental approach to statutory interpretation.
The followi~g year, the Court again narrowed the scope of sect~on
16(b). In Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,79 Occidental had, by means of a public tender offer, acquired more than
ten percent of the shares of Kern County Land Co. ("Old Kern").
Old Kern had aggressively resisted Occidental's takeover attempt,
and entered into a defensive merger with Tenneco, Inc. Recognizing
that, following the Old Kern-Tenneco merger, Occideptal would end
up owning a significant minority position in Tenneco (which it did
not wish to own), Occidental entered into an option agreement by
which Tenneco could re-purchase Occidental's Tenneco stock six
months and one day after the expiration of Occidental's tender offer.
Tenneco made a down payment of $8.8 million for the option against
the full $84.2 million purchase price while the six-month waiting period was still running. ·The question before the Court was whether
either the merger itself (by which Occidental traded its Old Kern for
Tenneco shares) or the execution of the buy-back option agreement
with Tenneco, constituted a "sale" subject to regulation under section
16(b).
This time the Court (now joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist), in an opinion by Justice White, applied a "pragmatic" rather
than a strict constructionist approach, holding that neither transaction was a "sale,"so and that section 16(b) ought not to apply because
at no time during the running of the six-month period did Occidental
have access to inside information or the opportunity to engage in
"speculative abuse."Sl Justice Douglas (this time joined by Justices
Brennan and Stewart) again dissented on the ground that the Court's
manipulation of section 16(b) undermined Congress's intent to discourage insider trading.s2 Ironically,. now it was the liberals who
were urging the more literal reading of the statute and the conservatives who professed to be serving Congress's "real" goals. However,
the focus of the analysis had shifted in Kern County from one merely
of statutory intent to one of business realities. Justice White's opinion in Kern County was comprised almost entirely of a detailed "real
79.
80.
81.
82.

411 u.s. 582 (1973).
Id. at 603-04.
Id. at 599.
ld. at 605 (Douglas, J ., dissenting).
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world" analysis of how business information was acquired by (or concealed from) Occidental and how corporate decisions are made.sa
Thus, another thread of the debate-that relating to managerial prerogatives-began to emerge, in which t:he conservative members of
the Court demonstrated an acute appreciation of the problems faced
by corporate managers and a willingness to resolve substantive law
questions so as to relieve them of liability when their wrongdoing
was not manifest.
The combined consequence of the Reliance and Kern County cases
was to deprive shareholders of the corporations, in whose stock profitable short-swing trading had occurred, of millions of dollars in damages and a fair assessment of attorneys' fees. Other decisions during
this period also reflected an increasingly restrictive view of the sorts
of securities-related claims which should be heard in the federal
courts,84 or the sorts of plaintiffs who ought to be able to advance
federal court claims.ss The vote was routinely 5-4, with Justices
Douglas and Brennan always in the minority and Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and White variously making up the remaining twosome.B6
But the clearest sign of the Court's antipathy to investors and their
use of federal courts to resolve differences with corporate managers
would come in the provocative language of Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,B7 issued at the close of the term in 1975.
Less than four years had passed since the· unanimous decision in
Bankers Life. Only three had passed since Affiliated Ute. However,
th~ atmosphere of the Court had changed substantially in the interim. Justice Douglas, the champion of the shareholder, had become
incapacitated and would soon resign to be replaced by a corporate
83. /d. at 598-99.
84. E.g., Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703
(1974) (corporation cannot recover from its former 98.3% owner for alleged violations
of federal securities laws and related state laws during the term of ownership) (Justices Marshall, Douglas, Brennan, and White disssented); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (corporation asserting violations of rule lOb-5 is bound by
agreement previously executed with defendant to arbitrate any dispute arising out of
the agreement in the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France) (Justices
Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented).
85. E.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (brokerage customers have no implied private right of action under the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970); Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416 (1972)
(trustee in reorganization lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of a corporation's
bondholders alleging breach of fiduciary duty by the corporation's indenture trustee)
(Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Blackmun dissented). See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Eisen was a case of enormous significance, holding that a representative plaintiff in a. rule 23(c)(2) class action was required to send
individual opt-out notices to all class members-estimated to number over two million
"odd-lot" traders in securities-and to bear the cost of doing so or else see the case
dismissed. (Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented).
86. See supra notes 84-85.
87. 421 u.s. 723 (1975).
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lawyer with predictably different sympathies.ss Not only was Justice
Douglas no longer an influential voice on the Court, his views were
now cancelled out by the far more management-protective instincts
of Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Moreover, Justice Rehnquist had
by now assumed his role as adjutant in Chief Justice Burger's campaign to reduce federal court caseloads.s9 The Court was beginning
to systematically eliminate whole portions of the federal court
docket,9o especially targeting class action plaintiffs91 and plaintiffs asserting implied private rights of action.92 The "new" Burger Court
was at last prepared to voice its new view of securities law enforcement. That voice was heard in Blue Chip.
D.

1975-1979: The Court Condemns "Strike-Suiters"

Plaintiffs in Blue Chip were retail store owners, who had for years
participated in the Blue Chip trading stamp program. Under the
terms of an antitrust consent decree, plaintiffs became entitled to
purchase common stock and debentures in a newly-organized corporation known as Blue Chip Stamps. Upon review of the Blue Chip
prospectus, which they later alleged to have been "materially misleading in its overly pessimistic appraisal of Blue Chip's status and
future prospects,"93 plaintiffs elected not to purchase the offered securities. When the value of the shares later rose, plaintiffs, suing on
behalf of a class of non-purchasers, sought $21.4 million for lost
opportunity.
88. Justice Douglas suffered a stroke in December 1974. Although he returned to
the Court in late March 1975, he was by then physically wasted and in constant pain.
He finally and reluctantly submitted his resignation from the Court in November 1975
and was replaced by Justice John Paul Stevens in December 1975. That Justice
Stevens later did not meet some conservatives' expectations is one of the recurring
quirks of Supreme Court history. But see L. Tribe, The Myth of the Surpiised President, in Goo SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985).
89. E.g., Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60 A.B.A. J. 787 (July 1974). Justice
Rehnquist commented,
I am frequently asked whether the Supreme Court is overworked. My answer
is that it is indeed overworked and that the nine members of the Court are
expected to do more than nine normally capable and diligent judges can be
expected to do and do in a professionally competent way.
Compare W. DOUGLAS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS: THE COURT
YEARS 385 (1980) (notion that the Court was overworked "was insane").
90. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (state prison inmates may
not proceed under federal civil rights laws in challenging denial of "good time" but are
limited to seeking habeas corpus, which requires exhaustion of state remedies).
91. See supra note 15.
92. See supra notes 14 and 85 (discussing Barbour).
93. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 726.
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It would have been no surprise if the Court had merely upheld as
matter of statutory construction the long-honored "Birnbaum rule,"
limiting standing in rule lOb-5 cases to actual purchasers and sellers
of securities.94 In fact, the Court did just that and ordered plaintiffs'
complaint dismissed.95 However, part III of the Court's opinion,
which was written by Justice Rehnquist, proceeded much further
into the "policy considerations" favoring a restrictive interpretation
of rule lOb-5.96 Describing the rule contemptuously as "a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn,"97 Justice
Rehnquist went on to cast aspersions on shareholder litigants generally. "There has been widespread recognition," he began, "that litigation under rule lOb-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in
degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general. "98 This perception was based on the notion that, because of the
huge damage awards and liberal use of federal discovery rules which
were possible in actions brought under rule lOb-5, many such suitsparticularly those brought as class actions and characterized in any
event as "nuisance" or "strike" suits99-were commonly brought
solely for their settlement potential.IOO "The prospect of extensive
deposition of the defendant's officers and associates and the concomitant opportunity for extensive discovery of business documents, is a
common occurrence in this and similar types of litigation,"tot noted
Justice Rehnquist (without citation) in a candid expression of his
concern for the prerogatives of corporate managers. He expressed
particular concern that corporations be spared "disruption of [their]
normal business activities"to2 due to shareholders' actions.
Moreover, he noted that expanding the class of plaintiffs entitled
to pursue relief under rule lOb-5, to those who had foreborne from
purchasing (or selling) shares, would encourage hindsight-aided testimony by the risk averse who had failed to trade.toa What the opinion
left unstated was that litigating shareholders, presumably guided by
their "strike suit" lawyers, are prone to falsify their testimony. This
represented yet another thread of the Supreme Court debate, focusing on the conservative mistrust of class activists.
One obvious reading of the Blue Chip decision is that its intention
94. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343
956 (1952).
95: Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731.
96. I d. at 737-49.
97. Id. at 737.
98. /d. at 739-40.
99. Id. at 740.
100. Id. at 741.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 742-43.
103. Id. at 746-47.

u.s.
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was not only to facilitate the quick dismissal of securities-related
lawsuits brought by non-buyers or sellers, but also to signal the district courts to hear with more caution the more traditional suits
which remained. Justice Rehnquist did nothing to dispel such a conclusion when he ended his comments with the gratuitous observation
that "we are not the first court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in this area of
the law will ultimately result in more harm than good."l04
Enter Justice Harry Blackmun, who at the time of Blue Chip was
about to inherit the mantle of Justice Douglas as the Court's most
outspoken protector of the "little investor." Justice Blackmun, in a
vigorous dissent joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, felt that
the "harm" which Justice Rehnquist sought to protect against was
nothing more than the discomfort of corporate executives and the
possibility of intensive federal court scrutiny of their manipulative
behavior. "[T]he Court exhibits a preternatural solicitousness for
corporate well-being," he scolded, "and a seeming callousness toward
the investing public quite out of keeping it seems to me, with our
own traditions and the intent of the securities laws."1os This was not
the first time Justice Blackmun had stood up for the small investor
seeking relief in the federal court.1oo And it would not be the last
time he challenged the Court's new paternalism toward corporate
man~gers.l07

The conservative majority's disdain for federal court shareholder
claims, particularly those brought as class actions, continued to
emerge in Supreme Court decisions, arising next in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochjelder.1os This case considered the question of whether "scienter" or a specific "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"l09 was
an essential element of private claims brought by shareholders under
rule 10b-5. Though the Securities and Exchange Commission argued
that it was not,no the Court in an opinion written by Justice Powell
held to the contrary.1n The focus of t~e majority was on strict statu104. Id. at 747-48.
105. Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing inter alia Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at
12).
106. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 128; supra notes
65-69 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 117, 210-11 and accompanying text.
108. 425 u.s. 185 (1976).
109. !d. at 187-88.
110. !d. at 197-98.
111. Id. at 214.
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tory construction, with ready reference to dictionary definitions to
reach the plain meaning of the statute.l12
One point in support of the Court's conclusion that scienter was required in rule 10b-5 actions was the observation that if plaintiffs were
excused from proving scienter in claims brought under rule 10b-5,
then no one would ever utilize the express but more limited shareholder recovery provisions of the 1933 Act.ua These provisionswhich did not require proof of scienter-were subject to various procedural restrictions not applicable to rule 10b-5, which had been imposed by Congress, Justice Powell observed, in part "to deter actions
brought solely for their potential settlement value."114
The implicit message was that to freely permit rule 10b-5 claims
without requiring plaintiffs to show scienter on the part of the defendant would encourage precisely the sort of shareholder "strike
suits" which Blue Chip had attempted to discourage. This implication was buttressed by the Court's specific recognition that rule lOb-5
claims in the absence of scienter "would significantly broaden the
class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose liability upon accountants
and other experts who perform services or express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts."ll5 As had clearly been seen in the
Blue Chip decision, where the Court refused to expand the class of
rule 10b-5 plaintiffs empowered to sue primary violators, this was not
a result to be sanctioned by the Burger Court. The articulation of
this desire to keep to a minimum acceptable categories of rule 10b-5
plaintiffs was a direct manifestation not only of the Court's antipathy
to "strike suits" but also of the more general "caseload" concerns of
the conservative majority. Justice Blackmun once again authored
the dissent,ns emphasizing the majority's disregard of the needs of
shareholders victimized by managerial misconduct.n7
Other cases during this period reinforced the exclusionary message
of Blue Chip and Hochfelder. In particular, in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc.,us the Court escalated the standard of materiality
which must be proven by a shareholder in an action brought under
the federal proxy solicitation rules.ll9 In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus112. !d. at 199 n.20-21.
113. !d. at 210-11.
114. !d. at 210-11 n.30.
115. ld. at 214 n.33.
116. !d. at 215. Only Justice Brennan joined in this dissent. It should be noted that
Justice Douglas had already resigned when this decision was rendered.
117. "Once again ... the Court interprets § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
... restrictively and narrowly and thereby stultifies recovery for the victim." ld. at
215-16 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting).
118. 426
438 (1976).
119. !d. at 449.

u.s.
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tries, Inc.,12o the Court held that a tender offeror, even one holding
over 500,000 shares in the target company, lacks standing to seek
damages for violations by a competing offeror of the disclosure provisions of the federal tender offer rules, notwithstanding that the former may be the best situated plaintiff (in terms of incentive and
financial resources) to pursue such claims.121 The decisions in TSC
and Piper, like those in Blue Chip and Hochfelder, were contrary to
the expressed views of the SEC, which argued in Piper that a more
receptive attitude toward private rights of action was necessary to ensure optimal enforcement of the federal securities laws.122 Presumably, that was no longer an objective of a majority of this Court.
Another major case in the Court's exclusionary campaign was
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,123 which considered the application of rule lOb-5 to "short-form" or "squeeze-out" mergers authorized under Delaware law. The Second Circuit had held that when
such transactions represented a breach of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority shareholders, they were governed by the "artifice to defraud" provisions of rule lOb-5, even where there had been
no material misstatements or omissions in any shareholder communications.l24 The Supreme Court reversed, relying on the strict constructionist approach of Hochfelder, and held that rule lOb-5 does not
apply to "instances of corporate mismanagement such as this, in
which the essence of the complaint is that shareholders were treated
unfairly by a fiduciary."125 Rather, actions under rule lOb-5 should
be restricted to conduct involving manipulation or deception.126
The opinion was written this time by Justice White, and rang a familiar note in light of the cases which had gone before. The Court
focused on the "plain meaning" of the statute's language.127 There
was also a reprise of the Court's apprehensions about interference
with mangerial prerogatives. The Court noted that to permit plaintiff's complaint to proceed would pose a "danger of vexatious litigation which could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs
120. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). (Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion concurring in
the judgment; Justices Brennan and Stevens dissented.).
121. /d. at 45-46.
122. Id. at 64 (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
123. 430 u.s. 462 (1977).
124. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1976).
125. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 477.
126. /d. at 473-74.
127. /d. at 472.
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under Rule lOb-5."128
The Court also noted that hearing complaints such as Green's
would interfere with the traditional state regulation of matters relating to corporate governance.129 Thus was raised the final item on
the Court's agenda of considerations, the federalism issue. Quite
contrary to the expressed preference in Bankers Life for federal
court resolution of claims "whatever might be available as a remedy
under state law,"130 the Court's preference had now shifted to state
court resolution of shareholder disputes wherever possible.
Although Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred in the judgment in Santa Fe, they declined to adopt the rhetoric of part IV of
the Court's opinion which related to the "[policy] considerations that
weigh heavily against permitting a cause of action under rule 10b-5
for the breach of corporate fiduciary duty."131 Instead, Justice Blackmun referred to his dissents in Blue Chip and Hoc}ifelder and Justice
Stevens referred to his dissent in Piper, in which they both cautioned
against the emasculation of the federal securities laws.1a2 Justice
Brennan dissented from the judgment in Santa Fe.1aa
Taken together, by 1977, Blue Chip, Hochfelder, and Santa Fe had
resolved all five of the Court's agenda items--caseload, class action
access, managerial prerogative, federalism and statutory integrity-in
favor of the conservative view. While the Court had not overruled
the fundamental principle that an implied private right of action exists to enforce rule lOb-5,134 it had clearly signalled that such actions
were no longer favored, and that continuing efforts to expand the
scope of rule 10b-5 were unlikely to succeed.
For the remainder of the period 1975-1979, the "new majority" of
the Burger Court repeatedly conveyed the message that the era of of
solicitude toward shareholders was over;135 so too was any thought
128. ld. at 478-79 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
740 (1975)).
129. Id. at 478.
130. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 604 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
131. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 477.
132. Id. at 480-81.
133. Id. at 480 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196.
135. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U .S. 471 (1979) ("disinterested" directors of an investment company may terminate a "non-frivolous" shareholders' derivative suit
brought against other directors under the Investment Company Act); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (limiting the definition of "security"
under both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (brokerage firm's clients have no implied private right
of action under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act against firm's accountants for facilitating
the filing of false reports with the SEC) (Justice Marshall dissented); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (shareholders have no implied private right of action to seek damages under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
although they do have standing to seek rescission of an advisor's contract) (Justices
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that the views of the SEC necessarily had persuasive authority before
the Court.136 The SEC had advanced on its own behalf, or as amicus
curiae, unsuccessful arguments in Blue Chip,137 Hoch/elder,138 Santa
Fe,139 Northway,140 Piper,141 Forman,l42, Cort,143 United States v.
White, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463 (1978) (denial of class certification in an action brought by securities purchasers was not an appealable order); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340
(1978) (investors in an action challenging conduct of an open-end diversified investment fund must bear total cost of assembling from defendant's records a mailing list of
class members); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 10.3 (1978) (SEC has no authority to suspend
indefinitely trading in exchange traded shares); Foremost-McKesson v. Provident Securities Co., 422 U.S. 232 (1976) (limiting coverage of section 16(b) "short-swing" provision); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976) (national bank sued for
violation of federal securities laws is subject only to the limited venue provision of the
National Bank Act and not the more inclusive provision of the Securities Exchange
Act) (Stevens dissented); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (requiring corporate plaintiff to make traditional showing of irreparable harm to support request for injunctive relief against purchaser in "technical default" of schedule 13D
filing requirement) (Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (excluding non-"traditional" shares
of stock from coverage under the federal securities laws) (Justices Brennan, Douglas,
and White dissented); see also Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979) (constitutional challenge to state anti-takeover law may be heard only in the
state in which law has been enacted) (Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall dissented); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978) (federal court may stay claim
under securities law-over which it has exclusive jurisdiction-where related state action is pending) (Justices Burger, Brennan, Marshall, and Powell dissented); Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (shareholders have no implied private right of action under
criminal statute prohibiting corporate contributions to presidential candidates);
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (shareholders' challenge to
fixed commission rates of Exchange member firms dismissed on grounds of antitrust
immunity); United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975) (SECregulated marketing practices of open-end mutual funds immune from coverage of federal antitrust laws) (White, Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissented).
But see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (defendants in a shareholders' class action are collaterally estopped from relitigating questions of liability
previously decided adversely to them in non-jury trial arising out of an SEC enforcement action, and this application does not violate the seventh amendment right to jury
trial); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm., 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (state cannot tax
stock transfers which occur out-of-state at a higher rate than those which occur in
state).
136. One commentator has observed that, during this same period in antitrust
cases, the Court's rule of thumb had changed from "the government always wins" to
"the government always loses." R. GALLOWAY, THE RICH AND THE POOR IN SUPREME
COURT HISTORY 174-75 (1982).
137. 421 u.s. 723 (1975).
138. 425 u.s. 185 (1976).
139. 430 u.s. 462 (1977).
140. 426 u.s. 438 (1976).
141. 430 u.s. 1 (1977).
142. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
143. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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NASD,144 Gordon,145 Radzanower,146 Sloan,147 Daniel,14B Burks,149
Leroy,1so and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors.151 And the worst
was yet to come with the advent of the new decade and the Court's
dismemberment of the SEC's insider trading theories.1s2
Though federal court solicitude toward shareholder grievances had
declined, the opportunity for abuse of shareholders in the financial
markets had not. Instead this opportunity for abuse actually increased. Initial public offerings increased in number and value
throughout the 1980's.153 Trading volume increased as well,154 as did
takeover activity,1ss attendant price volatility,156 and sales of new financial "products," all of which presented opportunities for fraudulent activity in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
With this increased economic activity came new pressures on the federal courts to hear and resolve shareholder grievances.
E.

1980-1987: A New Reception for a Limited Class of Shareholders

During the 1980's, the Court continued to transmit subtle and notso-subtle messages designed to chill the litigating ardor of shareholders.157 This was especially evident in the Court's decisions compelling the enforcement of arbitration agreements where customers
filed complaints against their brokers.1ss These decisions reflected
144. United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
145. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
146. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 103 (1978).
147. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
148. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
149. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
150. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
151. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
152. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (conviction of insider trader
based upon the "misappropriation" theory upheld by a bare 4-4 vote); Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646 (1983) (SEC censure of investment analyst who passed along tips to customers reversed where analyst had merely received information from a corporate insider and the tipper had violated no duty of non-disclosure) (Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall dissented); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)
(criminal conviction of defendant who traded on the basis of material non-public information is reversed because he owed no duty of disclosure to the trading public) (Justices Burger, Blackmun, and Marshall dissented).
153. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT, Table 25 (1987) The
number of registration statements grew from 3402 in fiscal year 1980 to 5925 in fiscal
year 1986 while the value of public offerings grew from $110,583,000,000 to
$484,383,000,000 during that same period.
154. /d. at Table 18 (showing exchange-traded share volume in fiscal year 1980 of
15,586,986,000 shares and in fiscal year 1986 of 48,580,524,000 shares).
155. Completed mergers increased in value from $32.9 billion in 1980 to $190.5 billion in 1986. MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS ALMANAC (1987).
156. See Big Board Votes to Curb Some Program Trades, WALL ST. J ., Feb. 5, 1988,
at 1, col. 1. The Dow Jones Industrial Average moved more than 50 points in a day 26
times between January 1986 and January 1988. /d.
157. See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
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the conservative majority's continuing view that the grievances of
small shareholders, whether against their financial advisors or
against corporate managers, are better heard elsewhere than in a federal forum.159
At the same time, there was a small boomlet of decisions which
seemed to liberalize the scope of the federal securities laws, enhance
their utility for private plaintiffs, and create new opportunities for
shareholder recovery.16o For example, the Court in 1981 gave a
broad interpretation to the statutory term "offer or sale."161 The following year, the Court held that investors in futures contracts could
maintain an implied private action for damages under the Commodity Exchange Act,l62 and that a paradigm ("first-generation") state
anti-takeover statute, the clear purpose of which was to impede cash
tender offers reflecting substantial profit for shareholders, was unconstitutional, at least in limited respects.163
(brokerage customers who have signed predispute arbitration agreements may be compelled to arbitrate their Exchange Act claims as well as RICO claims) (Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented in part); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (shareholder alleging violations of the Exchange Act together
with pendent state claims may be compelled to arbitrate the state-law claims, notwithstanding their similarity to federal claims and the resultant inefficiency of multiple
hearings) (unanimous decision); see also Zosky v. Boyer, 109 S. Ct. 868 (1989) (denying
certiorari on question whether a district court order compelling arbitration in a securities fraud case is an appealable final order).
159. Justice Blackmun predicted that the decisions compelling the enforcement of
predispute arbitration agreements, "no doubt animated by [the Court's) desire to rid
the federal courts of these [shareholder] suits," actually may increase federal court litigation. Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
160. The Court also (and contrary to its posture in the insider trading cases)
strengthened the power of the SEC in ruling that the agency had no obligation to notify targets of nonpublic investigations prior to issuing third party subpoenas. SEC v.
Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735 (1984). The Court also ruled that adjudicatory findings by the Commission were subject only to a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
of proof. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981). However, in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U .S. 680
(1980), the Court held that the SEC, like a private litigant, must show scienter in order
to prevail in a claim under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and section 17(a)(1) of
the Securities Act. Id. at 695, 697 (Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented in part).
161. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981) (pledge of stock to bank as collateral for loan held to be offer or sale). Application of this term to a pledge of stock was
not surprising, nor did it have anything to do with the rights of shareholders. The case
involved criminal charges against a corporate official who had participated in the submission of false financial statements to an institutional lender. Id. at 426-27.
162. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (Justices
Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor dissented).
163. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). Much of MITE's influence was undone by the Court's later decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69
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In a particularly receptive 1983 decision, Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston,164 the Court ruled that plaintiffs may pursue implied
claims under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, notwithstanding
overlapping express provisions of the Securities Act.165 Moreover,
section 10(b) claims need only be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence, rather than to the clear-and-convincing standard applied by
many jurisdictions in common law fraud cases.166
Two decisions issued in 1985, and both appeared to further expand
the private use of rule 10b-5 beyond its previous boundaries. In Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,167 a unanimous opinion
authored by Justice Brennan, the Court ruled that an investor who
alleges he has been deluded by a "tipper" into believing that he is
trading on the basis of inside information when he is not, may maintain a cause of action against the tipper under rule lOb-5; he is not
automatically subject to dismissal under the doctrine of in pari
delicto.16B The rationale for this decision was that "denying the in
pari delicto defense . . . will best promote the primary objective of
the federal securities laws-protection of the investing public and the
national economy. .. ,"169 The Court took particular note of the need
to facilitate private enforcement of the securities laws in light of the
inadequacy of the SEC's resources,170 a position last considered favorably by the Court in Borak,111 and one which in the interim had received a cold response in Piper.172
The decision in Bateman, Eichler was not likely to have a significant impact on federal court dockets, given that few investors would
be inclined to pursue claims where there was a substantial likelihood
that their own violations of the law would be exposed. Moreover, the
decision provided little, if any, practical value to shareholders suing
in the class action context. A more important decision was Landreth
(1987), which upheld as constitutional a "second-generation" anti-takeover statute. See
infra note 189 and accompanying text.
164. 459 u.s. 375 (1983).
165. !d. at 387.
166. /d. at 390.
167. 472 u.s. 299 (1985).
168. /d. at 312.
169. /d. at 315.
170. /d.
171. 377 u.s. 426, 432-33 (1964).
172. 430 U.S. 1, 42~43 (1976). The notion that routine use of the in pari delicto defense would thwart an important means of law enforcement was reenforced in the
Court's decision in Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988). There, Justice Blackmun,
writing for the Court, noted that the defense should only be available where its use
would not "significantly interfere with the effective enforcement of the securities laws
and protection of the investing public." /d. at 2071 (quoting Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S.
at 310-11). He specifically noted that "in many instances a private suit is the only effective means of detecting and deterring a seller's [violation of the securities laws]."
/d. at 2074.
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Timber Co. v. Landreth,173 in which the Court abolished the "sale-ofbusiness" defense to rule 10b-5 actions, and held, contrary to the view
shared by many commentators and courts of appeals,174 that an investor who buys 100% of a closely-held business, by acquiring its
shares, is entitled to the protection of the federal securities laws and
may pursue claims of fraud in federal court in connection with the
purchase.175 The same holds true for the investor who acquires less
than 100% of a closely-held business, with the intention of actively
participating in its management.176 It would not have been surprising had the Burger Court, having added an additional conservative
member,177 chosen to narrowly read rule 10b-5 to exclude such transactions from the coverage of federal law, on the ground that the
problems presented in sale-of-business cases had traditionally been
relegated to state court resolution.178 For conservatives on the Court,
Landreth created an additional dilemma between its desire to limit
the scope of private actions under the securities laws and its reluctance to interpret a statute inconsistent with its "plain language."
Surprisingly, statutory construction won the day.179 In an opinion
written by Justice Powell, the Court construed the statutory term
"security," and its subsidiary definition "stock," to encompass sales of
businesses effectuated by the transfer of "stock." "Although we recognize that Congress did not intend to provide a comprehensive federal remedy for all fraud," Justice Powell wrote, "we think it would
improperly narrow Congress' [sic] broad definition of 'security' to
hold that the traditional stock at issue here falls outside the Acts'
coverage.''ISO
The defendants in Landreth tried to appeal to the conservative majority's instincts. For example, they unsuccessfully urged the Court
173. 471 u.s. 681 (1985).
174. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1351-52 & nn.2-10 (9th
Cir. 1984).
175. Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 696-97.
176. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985) (Stevens dissented).
177. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined the Court on September 25, 1981, replacing Justice Stewart.
178. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
179. A similar dilemma faced the Court at about the same time in the civil RICO
cases, with the same result. Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 503 (1985) (Justices
Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell dissented).
180.' Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 687-88. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that
section 10(b) should be limited to transactions involving "(i) the sale of a security that
is traded in a public market; or (ii) an investor who is not in a position to negotiate
appropriate contractual warranties and to insist on access to inside information before
consummating the transaction." /d. at 699 (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
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to consider the "economic reality" of the transaction, suggesting that
the plaintiff . "was not a passive investor of the kind Congress intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur."lBl The
Court declined to engage in economic analysis, even though it had
done so in other cases,1s2 because the plaintiff had acquired "stock"
rather than some more amorphous form of interest.183 By now, the
Court was rooted in the language of the statute, notwithstanding
what Congress may have had in mind.
The defendants also argued that abandoning the sale-of-business
doctrine would "increase the workload of the federal courts."l84 Unpersuaded, the Court noted that application of the doctrine often required a fact-finding process (involving whether or not the acquirer
had transferred "control") which would be unnecessary under its ruling.lss Moreover, the Court implied that, by eliminating ex ante uncertainty in business transactions with respect to the "control" issue,
its decision would facilitate such transactions and reduce their
costs.1ss
Landreth, unlike Bateman Eichler, had the potential for substantial impact on the federal courts. Thousands of businesses change
hands each year, often later spurring buyer's remorse. With the federal securities laws now deemed to cover many such transactions, it
was fair to assume that many corporate acquirers would soon resort
to the federal courts for resolution of their claims. But Landreth
hardly represented a reversion to the expansive view of rule 10b-5
characteristic of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The interests of a corporate acquirer in recovering from its seller are quite different from
the interests of thousands of small shareholders in recovering from a
corporation in which they have invested. Certainly the logistical demands on the court are less. More important to the Burger Court,
Landreth-type actions pose no risk of extracting from the defendant
a large settlement, often expressed principally in attorneys' fees, paid
primarily to avoid the costs and disruption attendant to defending the
case, and frequently disproprortionate to the true merits of the plaintiff's complaint. These settlements do little to interfere with the defendant's ongoing business operations (those operations having been
sold to the plaintiff).
In short, with the exception of Huddleston and possibly Randall v.
181. 471 U.S. at 687-88.
182. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (looking at the economic
reality, rather than the form, of a transaction determines whether an "investment contract" is involved).
183. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 690-91.
184. /d. at 696.
185. /d. at 696-97.
186. /d.
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Loftsgaarden,187 the "pro-plaintiff" decisions of the 1980's were not
"pro-shareholder" decisions, insofar as that term contemplates the
"typical" small investor acting as a class representative. Moreover, in
addition to the arbitration cases,1ss there was another group of decisions during this period decidedly adverse to the needs of the private
investor. The Court accepted in 1987 a "second-generation" state
anti-takeover statute,189 which, like all such statutes, was decidedly
pro-management in orientation and arguably adverse to shareholder
interests.190 There was also the Court's exclusionary treatment of
federally-protected tender offerees when a tender offer is terminated.191 With strong implications for individual shareholders (who
are the "victims" of insider trading but whose interests were not at
issue in the cases before the Court), the Court very narrowly interpreted the scope of rule 10b-5 in the context of insider trading.192
The Burger Court revived its tradition of strictly construing the jurisdictional term "security."193 The Rehnquist Court perpetuated this
tradition by narrowly construing the statutory definition of a
"seller."194
The composition of the Court in these "anti-shareholder" decisions
is especially telling, but hardly surprising. The 1970s had already
seen Justices Blackmun and Brennan taking up the cause of the
small shareholder and dissenting regularly in securities cases.195
187. 478 U.S. 647 (1986) (plaintiffs entitled to rescission not offset by any tax benefits enjoyed by them during the period of ownership in actions brought under section
12(2) of the Securities Act).
188. See supra note 158.
189. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (Justices White,
Blackmun, and Stevens dissented).
190. Id. at 1654 (White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (The Indiana Control Shares Acquisition Chapter, in some circumstances, prevents minority shareholders from "acting in their own best interests by selling their stock.").
191. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) ("arguable breach of contract" by tender offeror who rescinds its offer after it has been fully subscribed does
not violate section 14(e) of the Exchange Act inasmuch as rescission does not constitute a "manipulative act" nor does it involve any misrepresentation or nondisclosure).
192. See supra note 153.
193. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (certificate of deposit is not a security); cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
194. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988). One might argue that the Court was
"liberal" in its interpretation of the term "seller" in this case, in that it did not limit
the term's application to those who pass title. Id. at 2076. However, the Court in defining the scope of the term "seller" rejected a number of far broader interpretations
which had been adopted by the circuit courts. Id. at 2080 n.25.
195. E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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They were frequently joined that period by Justices Stevens and
Marshall.196 Justices Blackmun and Brennan continued their
steadfast support of shareholder protection in the 1980s197 while Justices Stevens and Marshall became increasingly vocal in matters relating to shareholder rights.198 When Justice Scalia joined the Court
in 1986, he fell predictably into the conservative camp in securities
cases.199
By the time Justice Kennedy joined the Court in February of 1988,
the philosophical camps on the Court were firmly set. On a continuum embracing the considerations previously discussed--caseload,
class action access, managerial prerogative, federalism and statutory
integrity-with only occasional aberrations, the ideological lines were
clearly drawn:
Rehnquist
White
O'Connor
Scalia

Blackmun
Brennan
Marshall
Stevens
Kennedy?200

It·was in this context that Basic, Inc. v. Levinson20l came before the

Court.
II. BASIC, INC V. LEVINSON

Basic, a spiritual descendant of the Borak-Mills era, involved the
complaint of a small shareholder suing on behalf of other shareholders similarly situated. Max Levinson's complaint, like those of the
plaintiffs in Borak and Mills, was that he and other class members
had been defrauded when Basic, Inc., in which they had invested,
196. E.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). It has
been said that Justice Marshall was essentially "indifferent, even demonstrably bored"
by such cases. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 291 (1985); see, e.g., cases cited
supra notes 84-85.
197. E.g., Dirks V. SEC, 453 U.S. 646 (1983).
198. E.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (White, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 422
U.S. 220 (1987) (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646 (1983) (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring; Brennan, J ., concurring;
Blackmun and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
199. E.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
200. Justice Kennedy, while sitting on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
had only two occasions to write in the field of securities laws, and they provide us with
scant guidance. In Texas Partners v. Conrock Co., 685 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1982), he
wrote to reverse the premature grant of summary judgment in a non-class case
brought under rule 14(a). In SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980), the issue
was the propriety of enjoining non-parties from taking action against entities in SEC
receivership.
201. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
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withheld material information from them. Unlike Borak and Mills,
no proxy solicitation was involved; therefore, Levinson's claim fell
under rule 10b-5.
Basic, Inc. had begun exploratory talks in September 1976 with
Combustion Engineering, Inc., aimed at a possible merger.2o2 These
talks were sporadic, with long periods of inactivity. Twice during
1977 and 1978, Basic's management had deflected inquiries from reporters and from the New York Stock Exchange concerning unusual
market activity in Basic's stock, once specifically denying that any
pre-merger negotiations were underway.2o3 In November 1978, Basic
issued a report to its shareholders, again disavowing knowledge of
"any present or pending developments which would account for the
high volume of trading and price fluctuations in recent months."204
One month later, Basic publicly announced the impending merger at
$46 per Basic share.
Max Levinson had sold his Basic stock during the course of the Basic-Combustion Engineering discussions, and thereby lost the substantial premium paid in connection with the merger. Levinson sued
on behalf of a class of those who had sold Basic stock between October 21, 1977 (the date of the first "denial" of merger negotiations)
and the day of the merger announcement, alleging that Basic and its
executives had violated rule 10b-5. The district court dismissed the
complaint on defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding
that Basic's public statements during the course of its pre-merger discussions had not been materially misleading.2os
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
the summary judgment, holding that, while Basic had been under no
general duty to disclose its. discussions with Combustion, it had assumed that duty when it denied discussions had, in fact, occurred.
Further, the court reasoned, "once a statement is made denying the
existence of any discussions, even discussions that might not have
been material in the absence of the denial are material...."206 Basic, Inc. sought certiorari and two issues made their way to the Court.
The first issue involved whether preliminary merger-directed discussions, which had not yet jelled on matters of "price and structure," could ever be sufficiently "material" to require disclosure to
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

/d. at 981.
/d. at 981 n.4.
/d.
/d. at 982.
/d.
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shareholders in the event of inquiry. A court wishing to interdict
shareholders from seeking relief in the federal courts could easily
have answered this question in the negative, as the Third Circuit207
and others had done.2os Instead, however, all six members of the
Court hearing this case ruled that the question of materiality does
not lend itself to such a "rigid formula";209 hence, a determination of
whether pre-merger negotiations have reached a material stage must
be made by a finder of fact on a case-by-case basis. The defendants
argued that such an approach would result in ex ante uncertainty as
to when disclosure should be made. However, Justice Blackmun,
writing for the Court, dispatched this point observing that it
"seem[ed] to be directed solely at the comfort of corporate managers"210 and therefore presumably could be disregarded. Justice
Blackmun chided, "[a] bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than
a standard that requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all
the circumstances. But ease of application alone is not an excuse for
ignoring the purposes of the· securities acts and Congress' [sic) policy
decisions. "211
The second issue before the Court involved whether the fraud-onthe-market theory could serve to satisfy the reliance requiremepts of
rule 10b-5.212 The district court had certified a class comprised of
Basic shareholders who had sold their shares after the date of Basic's
first allegedly-misleading public statement.213 In order to find that
common questions of fact or law predominated over questions applicable to individual plaintiffs, the district court had adopted a reputable presumption that all putative class members had relied on the
integrity of Basic's market price on the date of the sale, and that this
market price necessarily reflected the allegedly misleading public
statements made by the company.214 Thus, by relying on a market
price which had been "defrauded" by false statements, the plaintiffs
could be said to have· relied on those statements, even though they
may never have heard or read them. In short, the court utilized the
207. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469

u.s. 1215 (1985).

208. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 984 n.10.
209. Id. at 986-87.
210. Id. at 985.
211. Id. Justice Blackmun's treatment of corporate managers' not unreasonable
wishes for certainty in their transactional negotiations is reminiscent of his tone ("preternatural solicitousness") in the Blue Chip dissent. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
The materiality portion of the Court's decision in Basic has been discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Classen, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson: Is Silence Really Golden?, 23 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 607 (1988); Matheson, Corporate Disclosure Obligations and the Parameters of Rule 10b-5: Basic Inc. v. Levinson and Beyond, 14 J. CORP. L. 1 (1988).
212. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 988-89.
213. Id. at 981-82 & n.5.
214. Id.
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fraud-on-the market theory, which had been adopted by "nearly
every court that has considered the proposition."215
In reviewing the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Court addressed
an issue which had the greatest potential to impact the number of
shareholder class actions since it upheld the "purchase or sale" requirement in Blue Chip.216 Adoption by the circuit courts of fraudon-the-market as a basis for solving the "reliance problem" had
opened a whole new arena for scrutiny by plaintiffs' class action lawyers. Previously most courts had held that actions under rule lOb-5
for allegedly material misstatements or omissions could be maintained on behalf of a class only wh~n the corporate defendant had issued a document, such as a prospectus or annual report, which a
court could reasonably assume had been sent to, and therefore presumably relied upon by all members of the proposed class.217 Fraudon-the-market provided a basis for class treatment in a host of other
circumstances, such as the press releases involved in Basic, in which
no document had been sent directly to shareholders. Moreover,
under a fraud-on-the-market theory, shareholders who had
purchased after a misleading document was issued could join in such
actions.21s In either case, the classes of shareholders entitled to sue
under rule lOb-5 were suddenly much broader than before.
Since the fraud-on-the-market theory first emerged in the mid1970s and spread among the circuits, many classic "strike suits"
brought on a contingent basis by lawyers acting for a small shareholder seeking to represent a large class of similarly situated shareholders have been pursued.219 Thus the potential impact of the
215. Id. at 991 & n .25. Fraud-on-the-market prior to Basic has been discussed in
Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements
in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 435 (1984); see also Rapp, Rule
JOb-S and "Fraud-on-the-Market"-Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shores, 39 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 861 (1982); Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery
Under SEC Rule JOb-S, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627 (1982); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982); Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory: Efficient Markets and the Defenses to an Implied lOb-S Action, 70 IOWA L. REV. 975 (1985).
216. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
217. E.g., Livesay v. Pun"ta Gorda Isles, Inc., 379 F . Supp. 386, 387 (E.D. Mo. 1974)
(individual reliance need not be shown where class members were sent registration
statement and prospectus), rev 'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1977), rev 'd
sub nom. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
218. E.g., Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 367 n.9 (8th Cir. 1986) (bondholders who may never have received offering prospectus but purchased in aftermarket
need not show reliance).
219. E.g., In re Texas Int'l Sec. Litig., 114 F .R.D. 33 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (lawyers in
fraud-in-the-market class action from famed Pomerantz strike suit firm in New York).
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Court's view of the fraud-on-the-market theory in Basic was clear. If
the Court rejected the fraud-on-the-market theory, the tide of such
cases would be stemmed. If the Court accepted the theory, such
cases would not only continue, but in the wake of Supreme Court acceptance, probably increase.
But the potential impact on "caseload" was only one of the considerations which the Court had to take into account in deciding
whether to hear, and ultimately how to resolve, the fraud-on-themarket issue. Other recurring issues on the conservatives' agenda
were presented as well.22o Fraud-on-the-market raised fundamental
issues relating to the conservative majority's concern about lawyergenerated class actions. The sole purpose for the fraud-on-the-market rule was to facilitate shareholder class actions,22t and advocacy
for its adoption came exclusively from strike suit lawyers. In addition, fraud-on-the-market defendants are stock issuers and ongoing
corporate enterprises. Therefore, to the extent that the theory is
bound up with questions concerning when a corporation has a duty to
disclose business information,222 fraud-on-the-market also presented
the potential for decisions gravely intrusive to managerial discretion.
Under these circumstances, when the Court granted certiorari in
Basic, an observer who had followed the pattern of decisions described above might have predicted with some confidence that fraudon-the-market as a substitute for proof of reliance was unlikely to
succeed.223 That confidence would have been well-founded until the
observer learned that three of the Court's most conservative members, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, would not be participating in
the decision.224
As a result of the unexplained failure of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia to participate in the case and the delay in confirm220. Unlike Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985), there was no apparent conflict between the desire of the Court's conservatives to limit the scope of
federal securities litigation and their obligation to give effect to the plain language of
the statute. Fraud-on-the-market is a judge-made concept based on economic theory,
not something which flows inevitably from the language of rule 10b-5, nor were any
federalism issues presented. Fraud-on-the-market is a construct inherently rooted in
federally imposed disclosure obligations and does not raise issues traditionally relegated to resolution in the state courts.
221. Black, supra note 215, at 459; Rapp, supra note 215, at 893.
222. See generally Gabaldon, The Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations as
an Imperfect Paradigm of Rule IOb-5 Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1218 (1987) (discussing an issuer's "affirmative duty to disclose"); In re General Motors Class E Stock
Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119, 1129 (D. Del. 1988) ("Absent a specific statutory
or regulatory duty, insider trading, a fiduciary duty or rumors attributable to the company, a corporation and its officers have no affirmative duty of disclosure.").
223. One commentator suggested in 1982 that fraud-on-the-market was "outrightly
aberrant" in light of the prevailing Supreme Court decisions of the day. Rapp, supra
note 215, at 865.
224. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 980, 993.
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ing a replacement for Justice Powell,22s the Justices who had in recent years most often supported shareholders' rights generally,226
and class action litigants in particular,227--Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens-found themselves in the majority of the
six-Justice panel. That majority upheld fraud-on-the-market for the
precise purpose of advancing the ability of injured shareholders to
sue as a class.
Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court, the first time he
had done so in a securities case since Affiliated Ute.22B Extrapolating
from the Affiliated Ute decision, in which reliance was held to be
presumed where a buyer had withheld material information from the
seller in a face-to-face transaction,229 the Court in Basic held that reliance could also be presumed in the impersonal trading markets.23o
The use of a rebuttable presumption in such circumstances would
avoid placing an "unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden"231 on
plaintiff litigants and would "facilitat[e] Rule 10b-5 litigation."232
The Court scarcely discussed the theoretical underpinnings of
fraud-on-the-market-the efficient capital market hypothesis.233
Rather, the Court relied on "common sense and probability"234 and
held that "[a]n investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the
225. Justice Kennedy joined the Court on February 18, 1988, several weeks after

Basic had been argued and assigned for decision. The decision was handed down on
March 7, 1988. /d. at 978.
226. See supra notes 105-07, 117, 133 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Parole
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (plaintiff allowed to pursue issue of whether
he was proper class representative even though personal claim had expired; Justices
Powell, Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist dissented).
228. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
230. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991-93.
231. /d. at 990.
232. /d. The practical problem presented by plaintiff's theory was that "[r)equiring
proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented [plaintiffs] from proceeding with a class action." /d. at
989.
233. Justice Blackmun quoted from Peil v. Speiser, 806 F. 2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir.
1986) to describe the relationship between the ECMH and fraud-on-the-market:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open
and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined
by the available material information regarding the. company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock
even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 988-89. He also cited rece;nt finance literature, but discounted the
need to adopt the ECMH in order to support the fraud-on-the-market presumption.
/d. at 991 n.24.
234. /d. at 991.
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market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price."235 The
Court mentioned only briefly the manner by which Basic could rebut
the presumption of reliance.236
Not surprisingly, the plurality's emphasis on facilitating class action enforcement of the securities law did not sit well with the participating Justices who over the previous decade had generally favored
a restrictive view of private actions under the securities laws. Justices White and O'Connor dissented from the use of the fraud-on-themarket theory, in part on the ground that it would encourage "speculators and their lawyers"237 to bring other such suits. Recalling the
concerns expressed in Blue Chip and Hochfelder concerning the
"harm" attendant to shareholder lawsuits, the dissenters regarded
this possibility as the "bitter harvest likely to be reaped from the
seeds sewn by [the majority's] decision."238 There is evidence the dissenters were correct.
Since the decision in Basic, the lower courts have utilized the
fraud-on-the market theory in the contexts of the over-the-counter239
and options markets.240 Even more ambitious uses of the fraud-onthe-market notion can be foreseen. For example, the SEC has argued that even where there is no active trading market, as in the case
of an initial public offering, plaintiffs ought to be entitled to a presumption of reliance on the integrity of the market not to support
the sale of unmarketable securities.241
The question now arises, will the decision in Basic inevitably lead
to a new flood of shareholder class. actions? The answer is "not necessarily." One possibility is that approval of fraud-on-the-market as a
basis for satisfying the commonality requirement in class actions will
fail to survive prompt reconsideration by the full Court in a subsequent case.242
Ironically, however, the fraud-on-the-market theory, based as it is
235. /d. at 991-92.
236. /d. at 992.
237. /d. at 999 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (Friendly, J ., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
238. !d.
239. Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 94,138 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
But see Epstein v. American Reserve, No. 79-C-4767 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1988) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (over-the-counter market is not an efficient market).
240. Tolan v. Computervision Corp., 696 F. Supp. 771 (D. Mass. 1988).
241. In Bank Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae,
Ross v. Rice, No. 86-7790 (Aug. 1988).
242. The approval by a plurality of the court of a principle of law does not necessarily ensure its approval by a subsequent, more "complete" panel. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1645 (1987). Given that only a minority of the Court
adopted the theory in the first instance, there is likely to be less reluctance to overrule
that decision than is the case where a change of the majority view is the result of a
change in Court personnel.
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in the economic theory of efficient capital markets, may not be received by the non-participating Justices with the same trepidation expressed by Justice White.243 While it is beyond the scope of this
article to discuss in detail the emergence of economic theory as a basis for decisions in business-related cases, it would seem that Justice
Scalia in particular is unlikely to agree with Justice White's assertion
that economic theory is beyond the expertise and understanding of
federal courts. Nor is Justice Scalia likely to be hostile to an economic analysis which is so closely identified with the "Chicago
School" from which he emerged. Indeed, as Justice White concedes,
Justice Scalia's former colleague at Chicago, Judge Richard Posner of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has expressly opined that fraud-on-the-market "produces the 'economically
correct result.' "244
It may not be necessary for the non-participants in the Basic decision to reject economic theorizing or to dispute the validity of the
fraud-on-the-market theory in order to overrule or at least severely
limit the decision in Basic. One way out, as Justice White pointedly
observed,245 may be suggested by the same treatise in which Judge
Posner affirmed the theoretical validity of fraud-on-the-market.
Damages under the theory are "difficult to quantify," Posner
warns,246 which may indicate why the plurality in Basic specifically
declined to address the measure of damages question.247 Specifically,
243. In dissenting, Justice White expressed the concern that, in embracing fraudon-the-market, the plurality was venturing "beyond its expertise." Basic, 108 S. Ct. at
995 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting "in part). "[W]ith no staff economists,
no experts schooled in the 'efficient-capital market hypothesis,' no ability to test the
validity of empirical market studies, we are not well equipped to embrace novel constructions of a statute based on contemporary microeconomic theory." /d. at 994.
Congress, with its superior resources and expertise, is far better equipped
than the federal courts for the task of determining how modern economic theory and global financial markets require that established legal notions of
fraud be modified. In choosing to make these decisions itself, the Court, I
fear, embarks on a course that it does not genuinely understand, giving rise to
consequences it cannot foresee.
/d. at 995. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
244. Id. at 995 n.5 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 15.8, at 423-24 (3d ed. 1986)). Of course, just as
"bad economics" may nevertheless make "good law," (see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1653 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment)) so may "good economics" make "bad law."
245. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 995 n.5 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
246. /d. (quoting R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 15.8, at 423-24 (3d ed.
1986)).
247. /d. at 992 n.28.
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the determination of damages in a fraud-on-the-market case ought to
take into account "social costs" which may be speculative and difficult to quantify.248 If damages are too speculative, there can be no
recovery ,249
Alternatively, damage determination may require a more conventional, though individualized, inquiry-for example, whether a seller
of shares in a rising market had also purchased during the period in
which the market had been defrauded,2so or whether the market on
any given date was skewed by factors other than the defendant's misrepresentation. If the task of determining damages for individual
class members were impossible to determine except through separate
trials, class treatment would be "unmanageable," and therefore, inappropriate under rule 23(b)(3).251 By adopting either the view that
damages in cases based on fraud-on-the-market are speculative, or
that they are too individualized for class treatment, the non-participating Justices would not be forced to retreat from the economic concepts underlying the Basic decision while still undermining the
decision's utility for shareholders.
Another way of short-circuiting the application of the fraud-on-themarket theory in shareholder class actions may be to broadly define
the ways in which the presumption of reliance can be rebutted. All
six Justices agreed that the presumption of reliance "must be capable
of being rebutted by a showing that a plaintiff did not 'rely' on the
market price."252 Justice White gave three examples of situations in
which a plaintiff could not state a valid claim: (1) "a plaintiff who
decides, months in advance of an alleged misrepresentation, to
purchase [the] stock";253 (2) "one who buys or sells a stock for reasons unrelated to its price;"254 and (3) "one who actually sells a stock
248. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 16.8, at 424 (3d ed. 1986).
249. Cf Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 543 (1983)
(plaintiff fails to state claim under section 4 of the Clayton Act where damages
claimed are "nothing but speculation").
250. Cf Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 998-99 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
251. Cf Fischer v. Dallas Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 106 F.R.D. 465, 470 (N.D. Tex.
1985) (court will not certify class comprised of all persons who had been denied loans
because of alleged "redlining," because there would have to be a separate and time
consuming class hearing to determine each class member's damages); Wilcox Dev. v.
First Interstate Bank, 97 F.R.D. 440, 444 (D. Or. 1983) (court will not certify class comprised of all "prime rate" borrowers, where damage determination does not lend itself
to a simple formula, but will require a borrower-by-borrower hearings). Contra Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 456 (3d Cir. 1977) (necessity of individual damage
calculations need not preclude class treatment if common issues predominate); Black,
supra note 212, at 441.
252. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 993-94 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253. /d. at 994.
254. /d. at 994.
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'short' before the misrepresentation is made."2ss
In one sense, this may seem academic when resourceful class action attorneys, usually through reciprocal information-sharing agreements with local stockbrokers, are able to find more "acceptable"
class representatives.256 But in a deeper sense, the issue of how the
presumption of reliance on a "defrauded market" can be rebutted
presents the most likely way in which fraud-on-the-market cases can
be defeated.
Basic found only that the fraud-on-the-market presumption would
suffice to satisfy the commonality element of rule 23(a); it did not
consider the separate typicality or manageability requirements ?f
rule 23(b)(3)(D). If the grounds upon which a defendant may rebut
the presumption of reliance on the market are drawn broadly
enough, as Justice White suggests, and the process of determining
which plaintiffs' claims are rebuttable is sufficiently complicated,
class action treatment will be inappropriate.257
For example, Justice White asserted that a shareholder "who buys
or sells a stock for reasons .u nrelated to its price" should not be included within the plaintiff class in a fraud-on-the-market case.2ss
How could such a determination be made? Presumably, it would require discovery into the investment goals and mental processes of
each putative class member, the sources of information consulted
prior to the purchase or sale and his understanding of market economics. It seems that even in Basic, on remand, the precise mechanics of rebutting the reliance presumption are yet to be understood.259
255. /d. The examples which the majority gives of ways in which the presumption
of reliance could be rebutted are much narrower and all involve situations. in which
the··market itself or the individual class member knew or believed the truth despite
the defendants' misstatement or omission. /d. at 992.
256. Cf. Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983)
(where class representative is found to be inappropriate, the solution is not decertification, but the appointment of a new representative); Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 74 F .R.D. 24, 39 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (action does not become most merely because
class representative loses his interest in it").
257. Cf. Abernathy v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 97 F .R.D. 470, 475 (N.D. Tex. 1983)
(court will not certify class comprised of all optometrists, opthamologists and dispensing opticians in the United States who were subjected to price discrimination because
establishing entitlement will require very individualized trials.).
258. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 994 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
259. See Note, Rule lOb-5: An Old Test of Materiality with a New Presumption of
Reliance, 34 LOY. L. REV. 593, 607 n.llO (1988) (noting the unresolved issues still facing
the parties in Basic, including "how the rebuttal will work in practice," the standard of
proof applicable to a rebuttal showing and whether the presumption must be defeated
"as to all plaintiffs or to a percentage.").
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Courts which have considered the questions of how and when defendants may rebut the presumption of reliance have reached inconsistent outcomes.260
In the end, it may be true, as Justice' White fears, that it will be
virtually impossible for defendants to rebut the presumption of reliance.261 Nevertheless, the issue is there to be explored, and Basic has
failed to provide the lower courts with any guidance in this area.
Eventually, this may be the issue on which the non-participating Justices can turn the Basic tide.
CONCLUSION

From 1964, when the Supreme Court first declared the existence of
an implied right of action under the securities laws, until the mid1970s, a majority of the Court led by Justice William 0. Douglas consistently expanded the circumstances under which shareholders' suits
could be maintained. Thereafter, as the Court came to be dominated
by a more conservative, business-oriented, and docket-conscious majority, this trend was halted. Further expansion in the lower courts
was expressly discouraged, especially in cases brought as shareholder
class actions.
Then, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the most liberal members of the
Court formed a majority of a six-Justice panel and, by approving the
fraud-on-the-market theory as a means of satisfying the reliance requirement of actions upder rule lOb-5, opened the door to a whole
new generation of shareholder class actions. Whether that door will
remain open, and how far, remains to be seen. But the questions left
unanswered in Basic promise to occupy the lower courts for some
time, and future Supreme Court consideration of the fraud-on-themarket theory and its application is inevitable. At the point of reconsideration, the three conservative Justices who did not participate in
Basic will face a problematic choice: whether to embrace the fraudon-the-market theory and encourage the class action activity that will
inevitably follow or to reject fraud-on-the-market in its entirety, as
260. Compare In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130 (D.N.J. 1984) (the
defense of non-reliance "goes to the merits of the case and cannot be considered by the
court on a certification motion"), rev'd on other grounds, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988);
with Epstein v. American Reserve Corp., No. 79-C-47-67 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, dist. file) (class certification denied where proposed class representatives were subject to "unique lack-of-reliance defenses" atypical of other class
members); and Zlotnick v. TIE Communications, 123 F.R.D. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (class
certification denied where complex questions of reliance would require extensive individualized proof). See generally Comment, Class Actions, Typicality, and Rule 10b-5:
Will the Typical Representative Please Stand Up, 36 EMORY L.J. 649 (1987); Black,
supra note 215, at 449-50.
·
261. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 996 n.7 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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Justice White suggests. On the other hand, the Court may, as it did
in the 1970s, simply chip away at the theory until all the strike suit
lawyers have gone home.
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